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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is hard to find consensus on questions of statutory interpretation.  Debates rage on about the 
appropriate goals of interpretation and the best means of achieving those ends.  Yet there is 
widespread agreement, even among traditional combatants on the statutory interpretation field, 
when it comes to so-called “common-law statutes.”  Textualists concede that text is not 
controlling;1 originalists admit that judicial construction of common-law statutes need not be 
keyed to the specific intent of the enacting Congress;2 and staunch defenders of strict statutory 
stare decisis allow frequent departures from precedent.3   
So what are common-law statutes?  It is easy enough to name a few, and courts and 
commentators often do.  The list always begins with the Sherman Act,4 and typically includes 
Section 1983,5 the Taft-Hartley Act, and statutory provisions on securities fraud.6  In the realm of 
intellectual property, scholars have argued that many of the major enactments make the cut.7   
What is missing is any clear conception of what defines this special category, uniting 
common-law statutes and distinguishing them from the rest.  The relevant case law and 
                                                   
* Professor, Duke University School of Law.  Much of the work on this Chapter was completed while I was on the 
faculty at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and I thank colleagues and staff there for their support.  Special thanks 
are due to the participants in this symposium for their comments, as well as to Rick Bierschbach, Michael Herz, Max 
Minzner, Alex Reinert, Kevin Stack, Stewart Sterk, and participants at the Legislation Roundtable held at Columbia Law 
School on April 8, 2011.  Michael Silverstein provided excellent research assistance.  
1 See Miranda McGowan, Do As I Do, Not As I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning 
Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 Miss. L.J. 129, 134 (2008) (“Justice Scalia entirely suspends textualism in about a 
quarter of the cases in the study’s sample because he believes that he is interpreting a statute that has granted common law 
authority to the courts.”).  
2 See Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) (arguing that “the domain of the statute 
should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved in the legislative process” except in the case of 
the Sherman Act and like statutes “that effectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law”) 
3 See Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 641 & n.12 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
“when the Court unequivocally rejects one reading of a statute, its action should be respected in future litigation,” but making 
an exception for common-law statutes like the Sherman Act and § 1983).  
4 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899-900 (2007) (“From the beginning the Court 
has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”); Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 544 (“The statute books are full of 
laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good example, that effectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law.”). 
5 See Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 421-22 (1989) (arguing that, 
because § 1983 “is silent on many important questions, including available defenses, burdens of pleading and persuasion, and 
exhaustion requirements[,] . . . the statute delegates power to make common law”). 
6 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007, 1052 (1989) 
(describing Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws as “common law 
statutes”); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (“When we deal with private 
[securities fraud] actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative 
acorn.”). 
7 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 1126, 1167 (2008) (describing the 
Copyright Act as a “common law statute”); Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 
187, 198-99 (2004) (describing the Lanham Act and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act as “delegating” statutes); Craig 
Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 51, 53 (2010) (describing the Patent Act as a 
“common law enabling statute”). 
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commentary reveal two features that are thought to qualify statutes like the Sherman Act for 
special treatment:  Such statutes are written in broad terms8 and build on a tradition of common-
lawmaking.9  In this Chapter, I argue that neither of the proposed distinctions is persuasive, as the 
relevant features are shared by many other statutes that do not appear on the privileged list.  Any 
differences are in degree, not in kind. 
Of course, it is hardly uncommon for the law to mistake points on a continuum for separate 
categories, and the “common-law” label may serve as an easy—if mildly inaccurate—shorthand 
for the group of statutes that actively embrace lawmaking by courts.  I hope to show, however, 
that the label is not so benign.  Instead, the continuing fiction that there is a categorical difference 
between common-law statutes and “normal” statutes like, say, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,10 works to obscure the difficult line-drawing problems that interpreters otherwise would 
have to confront.   If statutes like the Sherman Act and Title VII coexist on a scale of statutory 
vagueness,11 it is a mistake to suggest that questions of interpretive methodology switch on and 
off in an automatic fashion depending on whether the statute at hand is a common-law statute.  
An additional problem with the “common-law” label is that it diverts attention away from 
significant questions concerning delegations of lawmaking power to the judiciary.  How should 
the legal system identify such delegations?  When are they a good idea, and when should 
Congress rely on agencies instead?  The notion that delegations to courts can be identified, and 
justified, simply by drawing an analogy to the Sherman Act conceals those issues from view.  But 
once the label is peeled back, it becomes clear that our current treatment of common-law statutes 
raises more questions than it answers about delegations to courts. 
II. COMMON-LAW STATUTES AND CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS 
In order to see what common-law statutes are and are not, it helps to begin with how they are 
treated.  Most everyone agrees that common-law statutes represent delegations to courts.12  (The 
harder question is why, and I turn to that below.)  Thus, common-law statutes are “enabling” 
statutes: they authorize courts to make law.13   
Understanding common-law statutes as enabling acts helps explain why interpreters of 
different stripes have been able to agree on a common methodology.  Simply put, delegations to 
courts take many of the familiar arguments about statutory interpretation off the table.  Consider 
the question whether courts should give effect to the intentions of the enacting legislators or 
interpret the statute dynamically in light of evolving norms.  Whatever may be true in other 
circumstances, it makes little sense to insist on fidelity to original legislative intent where the only 
                                                   
8 See infra Part III. 
9 See infra Part IV. 
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17. 
11 For ease of exposition, I use the Sherman Act and Title VII throughout this Chapter as examples of “common-law” 
and “normal” (i.e., not common-law) statutes, respectively. 
12 See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 Yale L.J. Online 47, 
53 (2010) (“In the world of what are sometimes known as common law statutes, broad delegation to the judiciary is 
uncontroversial, and the legislature expects judges to develop the law over time by utilizing a free-form common law 
method.”).  For a discussion of delegations to courts generally, see Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially 
Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 405 (2008). 
13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 52 (student ed. 1985) (“[T]he Sherman Act can be 
regarded as ‘enabling’ legislation—an invitation to the federal courts to learn how businesses and markets work and 
formulate a set of rules that will make them work in socially efficient ways.”). 
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discernible intent on the issue was to leave it to the courts.14   
More fundamentally, much of statutory interpretation theory is focused on controlling or 
justifying a judicial role in the project of law creation and development.  For example, textualists 
reject common-law approaches to statutory interpretation on the ground that “[i]t is simply not 
compatible with democratic theory that laws mean whatever they ought to mean, and unelected 
judges decide what it is.”15 The argument assumes that judges have a choice: They can “stick[] 
close to the surface of statutory texts,” thereby leaving policymaking in the hands of Congress, or 
they can embrace a policymaking role of their own.16  But that choice evaporates when Congress 
delegates broad lawmaking power to the courts.  The Sherman Act—the prototypical common-
law statute—illustrates the point.  Although the Act prohibits all contracts, conspiracies, and 
combinations “in restraint of trade,”17 the Supreme Court long has held that the operative question 
is whether the conduct at issue restrained trade unreasonably.18  A “reasonableness” standard 
plainly invites judicial policymaking.  The standard requires further elaboration to clarify its 
contents, and even the Court’s most committed textualists recognize that the text of the statute 
plays a minimal role in that process.19 
Similar reasons explain the Court’s relaxation of statutory stare decisis in the context of 
common-law statutes.  Federal courts normally purport to apply a super-strong version of stare 
decisis to statutory precedents, on the view that once a court authoritatively interprets a statute, 
any change should come from Congress.20  That view rests in part on the notion that the 
“‘functional consequences’” of overrulings are “‘legislative rather than judicial.’”21  And it rests 
in part on an assumption that Congress “approves” of any interpretations it leaves in place.22  
Finally, super-strong statutory stare decisis reflects a sense that Congress is the appropriate body 
to weigh the advantages of updating the law against the likely disruption of public and private 
reliance interests.23   
Each strand of reasoning suggests a discomfort with judicial lawmaking and a preference for 
                                                   
14 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 46 (1985) (explaining 
how delegations to courts can coexist peacefully with an intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation).  
15 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 22 (1997). 
16 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 908 (2002). 
17 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
18 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (“While § 1 could be interpreted to 
proscribe all contracts, the Court has never taken a literal approach to its language.  Rather, the Court has repeated time and 
time again that § 1 outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
19 See Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in this Class?” The Conflict Between Textualism and 
Antitrust, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 619, 621 (2004) (“[A]lthough textualists have sometimes been described as striving 
with missionary zeal to narrow the focus of consideration to the statutory text and its “plain meaning,” this is hardly true in 
antitrust law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
20 See Amy Coney Barrett Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317, 348 (2004) 
(“[C]ourts most often assert simply that if a prior judicial interpretation does not capture the statute’s meaning, Congress 
can—and therefore should—be the one to fix it.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J. 
1361, 1366-68 (1987) (describing the rationale for statutory stare decisis).  Cf. Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: 
The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 177, 200-19 (1989) (arguing that any judicial 
policymaking is countermajoritarian and should be avoided, and proposing that the Supreme Court shift policymaking 
responsibility back to Congress by applying an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis). 
21 Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1366 (quoting Frank E. Horack, Jr., Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 
25 Tex. L. Rev. 247, 250-51 (1947)) 
22 Alex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1940). 
23 Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1357. 
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congressional action.  But such reasoning seems out of place in contexts like antitrust, where the 
Court has been thrust headlong into a lawmaking role.  Why insist that Congress make this 
decision, when courts have made so many others?  Recognizing as much, the Court has treated the 
Sherman Act and other common-law statutes as exceptions to statutory stare decisis.24  Since 
common-law courts would not apply an especially strict version of stare decisis when developing 
the law, the Court assumes that the same should be true of common-lawmaking pursuant to 
statute.  
All of this makes sense if common-law statutes are viewed in isolation from the rest of 
statutory law.  But a puzzle emerges if we consider such statutes alongside their cousins in the 
administrative sphere—statutes that delegate to agencies.  The comparison reveals that, while the 
methodological consequences of a delegation are similar in the judicial and administrative 
contexts, the means of identifying delegations are significantly different. 
At first blush, delegations to agencies seem to support the methodological approach courts 
have taken to common-law statutes.  We do not expect agencies to adhere to the specific 
intentions of the enacting Congress, because we recognize that Congress may have chosen open-
textured commands over specific directives so that the agency could work out the details.  We do 
not expect agencies to “stick[] . . . to the surface of the text” of the statutes they implement, 
because we recognize that the text is often vague or incomplete.  And we do not expect agencies 
to set their statutory interpretations in stone, because we recognize that the relative flexibility of 
administrative decisionmaking is one of its primary advantages over legislation. 
These views are captured in the Court’s seminal decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
25
 which acknowledges that an agency’s resolution of statutory 
ambiguity inevitably entails an exercise of discretion.  The agency’s job, the Court explained, 
“necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left . . . by 
Congress.”26  When Congress’s intent is unclear, the agency has no choice but to make “policy 
choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not 
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency . . . .”27  
The prevailing approach to common-law statutes effectively empowers courts to act like 
agencies do.  Courts develop the law in the context of specific cases and controversies28 rather 
than via generally applicable regulations,29 and judge-made law may differ in important respects 
from agency-made law.30  Nevertheless, the notion that congressional delegations call for an 
interpretive approach that is both flexible and sensitive to policy unites the worlds of agency-
administered and common-law statutes. 
The difference lies in how courts identify the triggers for judicial and agency lawmaking.  
Some agency statutes make the authorization explicit, directing agencies to enact regulations 
implementing the terms of the statute and in some cases making clear that the statute will have no 
                                                   
24 Id. at 1377-81. 
25 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
26 Id. at 843. 
27 Id. at 865. 
28 U.S. Const’n, Art. III. 
29 See Administrative Procedure Act, § 5 U.S.C. § 553 (detailing the procedural requirements for agency rulemaking). 
30 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of 
Title VII, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 363, 387-433 (2010) (discussing differences between the Supreme Court’s and the EEOC’s 
interpretations of Title VII). 
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legal effect until the agency acts.31  Explicit delegations of substantive lawmaking power to courts 
are rare.32  But courts long have recognized that delegations may be implicit as well as explicit.33 
Under Chevron’s famous test, if “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue,” the court must defer to the agency’s answer so long as it is “reasonable.”34  Thus, statutory 
ambiguity is “agency-liberating” in the sense that it converts the administrative inquiry from a 
search for what the statute means to a determination of what it ought to mean.35  Provided that 
Congress has vested the relevant agency with the authority to act with the force of law,36 the only 
question for the reviewing court is whether the agency “acted within the scope of its discretion.”37  
Matters look very different in the judicial context.  Although statutory ambiguity may open 
the door to non-textual sources of statutory meaning, it is hardly the case that all judges take 
ambiguity as an implicit authorization for them to make law in the freewheeling manner permitted 
agencies and associated with common-law statutes.  Textualist judges see ambiguity as a 
challenge that can be surmounted by reference to statutory context and the canons of construction.  
For intentionalist judges, textual ambiguity simply means that other indications of congressional 
intent must be consulted.  The goal remains the same, however:  Identify what the statute means 
and give effect to that meaning.38  Moreover, while agencies are free to change their 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes, courts are not.39 It is only in the realm of common-law 
statutes that these constraints on judicial decisionmaking can be avoided without controversy.  
The location of the dividing line is far from clear, but it is clearly not the line that courts have 
drawn in the administrative sphere. 
Courts’ treatment of common-law statutes therefore begs the important question why the 
                                                   
31 See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 369, 381 (1989) 
(discussing agency statutes that are intransitive in application). 
32 Congress sometimes explicitly empowers the federal courts to create procedural law.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for federal cases); 
Fed. R. Evid. 501 (providing that in federal question cases, “the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political 
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the 
United States in light of reason and experience”).  On the substantive side, the best example is Section 301(a) of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, which provides for federal court jurisdiction over “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an 
employer and a labor organization . . . in an industry affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).  On its face, that provision is 
simply a grant of jurisdiction and not a delegation of lawmaking power at all.  Nevertheless, the Court interpreted has § 
301(a) as an authorization to the federal courts to “fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective 
bargaining agreements.” Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957); cf. Michael Rosensaft, The Role 
of Purposivism in the Delegation of Rulemaking Power to the Courts, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 611, 614 & n.9 (2005) (citing “liberal 
construction” clauses as a species of explicit delegation).  
33 U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“‘[S]ometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular 
question is implicit.” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844)). 
34Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
35 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, at 521. 
36 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27 (limiting Chevron deference to instances where Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and the agency exercised that authority when adopting the interpretation at 
issue). 
37 Scalia, supra note 35, at 516. 
38 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 Duke L.J. 549, 559 (2008) (“Although the dominant theories of 
statutory interpretation differ in many ways, they share an important feature; they invite courts to construe statutory text as if 
Congress intended that text to have a relatively specific meaning.”). 
39 See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996) (explaining that while an agency “[e]ntrusted within its sphere to 
make policy judgments” may change its interpretations, courts “do not have the same latitude to forsake prior interpretations 
of a statute”). 
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“agency liberating” line is different from the court-liberating line.  And where, exactly, is the 
court-liberating line?  As noted above, two possibilities emerge from the relevant case law and 
commentary.  One is that common-law statutes are defined by the nature of their texts:  Although 
mere ambiguity is not enough to signal a delegation to the judiciary, truly open-textured language 
is.  The second possibility is that common-law statutes are defined by the fact that they were 
enacted against a backdrop of common law.  In the remainder of this Chapter, I seek to show that 
neither of the proposed definitions supports a sharp distinction between common-law statutes and 
other judicially administered acts.  If statutory ambiguity is a poor proxy for identifying 
delegations to courts, we have yet to find a better one.   
III. “SWEEPING, GENERAL TERMS” 
Perhaps the most conventional way of describing common-law statutes is by reference to how 
they are written.  Common-law statutes, we are told, are “phrased in sweeping, general terms.”40  
Congress did not define the precise content of common-law statutes, but instead “expect[ed] the 
federal courts to interpret them by developing legal rules on a case-by-case basis in the common 
law tradition.”41 
As a description of statutes like the Sherman Act, that characterization is uncontroversial.  It 
does not work, however, to define a self-contained category of statutes.  So-called common-law 
statutes represent a subset of the larger class of statutes for which courts have primary interpretive 
authority.  It is no secret that many statutes in that larger class contain gaps and ambiguities.42  In 
the hands of agencies, such statutes would be taken as implicit delegations of policymaking 
authority.  But with no agency to fill in the blanks, the job is entrusted to judges.  How and why 
are such judicially administered statutes different from common-law statutes? 
Consider a statute like Title VII—a “normal” statute that most would agree lies outside the 
privileged common-law category.  Title VII bars employment discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, religion, and national origin, but leaves many key issues to be resolved by courts in the 
course of case-by-case adjudication.  For example, the statute does not define the term 
“discrimination” and it says nothing about whether or to what extent “employer[s]” are liable for 
the actions of supervisors or other employees.  In short, it is “silent or ambiguous”43 in significant 
respects.  And, because the relevant agency does not have the authority to create binding 
substantive regulations interpreting and implementing Title VII, as a practical matter courts are 
responsible for elaborating the meaning of the statute.44  Thus, even if it is not a common-law 
statute, Title VII constitutes a delegation to courts.45   
To be sure, the delegation is more limited than the Sherman Act’s, and the commands of Title 
VII are specified in more detail than those of federal antitrust law.  But the differences are not 
categorical differences; they are differences in degree.  It should come as no surprise, then, that 
proponents of purposive, dynamic statutory interpretation advocate a purposive, dynamic 
approach to interpreting Title VII.46  Yet, while such arguments are widely accepted in the narrow 
                                                   
40 Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 641 & n.12 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
41 Id.  
42 See Lemos, supra note 12, at 429-34. 
43 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
44 See Lemos, supra note 30, at 384-87 (describing Title VII’s institutional arrangements). 
45 See id. 
46 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1488-96 (1986) (pressing a 
dynamic approach to interpreting Title VII); id. at 1517-18 (arguing that the reasons for interpreting statutes dynamically 
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context of common-law statutes, they are met with stiff resistance when applied to most other 
judicially administered statutes, including Title VII.47 
If statutes like Title VII and the Sherman Act represent different degrees of delegation rather 
than distinct conceptual categories, it becomes harder to explain why the appropriate interpretive 
methodology changes as courts move from one to the other.  That is not to say that an explanation 
is unavailable, but merely that one is needed.  Perhaps a textualist, for example, would answer that 
the more comprehensive text of Title VII enables a textual approach that is not possible in 
Sherman Act cases.  On that view, the textualist concession for common-law statutes is akin to an 
impossibility defense, and the difference between statutory ambiguity and “sweeping . . . 
general[ity]” matters because it marks the line where textualism becomes infeasible. 
My own view is that the proposed textualist distinction is unpersuasive.  First, it is not 
obviously true that a textualist approach is not feasible in the context of the Sherman Act.48  Not 
only does the Sherman Act itself contain clues that textualism ordinarily would attend to, but 
Congress has enacted several other statutes in the antitrust field that speak in far more specific 
terms.49  Moreover, the Sherman Act incorporates the common-law concept of “restraint of trade.” 
Although that concept may be “dynamic,”50 a textualist approach would focus on the evolving 
content of the common law, whereas the Court has treated the common law as a jumping-off point 
for independent policy analysis.51  Indeed, what is striking about the prevailing judicial approach 
to antitrust law is that courts do not even try to find guidance in the relevant statutory texts and 
other textualism-approved sources of meaning.   
Second, it is not clear that textualism is capable of achieving its normative goals in the context 
of statutes that delegate less broadly than the Sherman Act.  I will not rehearse here the many 
arguments that have been levied against textualism, but it is worth mentioning at least one 
problem with a textualist approach to Title VII and like statutes: deliberate ambiguity.  Even 
within a relatively comprehensive statute, legislators may use ambiguity to secure majority 
support for provisions that could not be enacted if they were explicit.52 Title VII itself contains 
                                                                                                                                                               
rather than “with strict regard to original legislative intent” “apply not only to common law statutes such as Section 1983 and 
the Sherman Act, but also to more detailed statutes as Title VII”). 
47 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (bemoaning 
the majority’s infidelity to “what the law as enacted meant”); cf. id. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring) (accepting a construction 
of Title VII “that is at odds with my understanding of the actual intent of the authors of the legislation” on the basis of stare 
decisis). 
48 Cf. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010) (taking a textualist approach to interpreting the Patent Act).  Although 
Bilski’s “textualist turn” is certainly open to criticism, see generally Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the 
Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Ground 
Patent Law Interpretation and Return Patent Law to its Technology Mooring, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1289 (2011), the majority’s 
opinion illustrates that a textualist approach is possible even for broadly worded statutes.  Indeed, the Bilski majority drew a 
textualist inference from the very breadth of the statute’s text, emphasizing the “ordinary meaning” of the “broad terms” 
governing patentable subject matter, and reasoning that Congress’s choice of “expansive terms . . . modified by the 
comprehensive ‘any’” weighs against recognizing judicially crafted exceptions.  130 S.Ct. at 3225-26. 
49 See Farber & McDonnell, supra note 19, at 644-54 (discussing the Clayton and FTC Acts); cf. Peter L. Strauss, The 
Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 225, 244 (1999) (“What the Court has made of the Sherman Act competes 
with what the text of the Act seems to say and what more recent enactments have been generally understood to 
accomplish.”). 
50 Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988). 
51 See Farber & McDonnell, supra note 19, at 632-39 (discussing several ways the common law could guide and 
constrain antitrust jurisprudence). 
52 Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 575, 595-97 (2002) (discussing statutory drafters’ use of deliberate ambiguity). 
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provisions that reflect a legislative agreement to disagree,53 as do other more detailed statutes.54  
Although it would be possible for a textualist interpreter to construct a meaning for such 
provisions, it is hard to see such behavior as an exercise of judicial restraint.55  Nor can such 
construction be defended on “democracy-forcing” grounds,56 as it does nothing to deter future 
legislative coalitions from dodging contentious questions while “both side[s] . . . hope that the 
Supreme Court w[ill] eventually rule in their favor.”57   
Finally, the proposed distinction entails an extremely stingy view of delegations to courts, 
suggesting that courts should decline congressional invitations to policymaking if they possibly 
can.  As I suggest below, there is a respectable argument that Congress is less likely to delegate to 
courts than to agencies, given concerns about courts’ comparative institutional competence and 
their political insulation.  Yet it is one thing to say that delegations to courts should not be lightly 
presumed, and quite another to suggest that that they must be rebuffed.  Absent a claim that 
delegations to courts are invalid (rather than merely a bad idea), a refusal to recognize statutes like 
Title VII as at least partial delegations would seem to reflect precisely the sort of contested policy 
judgment that textualism insists be left to Congress. 
The important point for present purposes, however, is not that textualist distinctions between 
Title VII and the Sherman Act are wrongheaded, but that they that ought to be brought out into 
the open.  As others have observed, the reasons textualists have offered for exempting antitrust 
law from the methodological strictures of textualism “are remarkably cursory.”58  The fiction that 
the Sherman Act is different in kind from other judicially administered statutes perpetuates this 
state of affairs, allowing textualists to finesse some of the hardest cases for their preferred 
approach without articulating why textualism gives way in contexts like antitrust, and where 
exactly it kicks back in.59 
IV.  COMMON-LAW HISTORY 
                                                   
53 See Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the 
Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 51, 52 (“[I]n enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
which amends Title VII . . . in many important respects, Congress was often purposefully ambiguous, essentially choosing 
not to decide polarizing issues in order to pass a bill the President would sign.”); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1992) (limiting courts’ consideration of legislative history regarding the term “business 
necessity” to an interpretive memorandum stating that the term is “intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the 
Supreme Court” in cases “prior to” Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)). 
54 See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in 
Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 627, 665-66 (2002) (discussing Congress’s agreement to disagree on 
the pleading standard set out in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995). 
55 Cf. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 52, at 618 (“If the expectation in a particular circumstance among those 
responsible for drafting a bill is that a court will resolve the meaning of a particular provision, is it activist or restrained for a 
court to insist that Congress answered that question and to attribute responsibility for its reading of the language to 
Congress?”). 
56 Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 103 (2000) (“A central argument for textualism is that it 
has a democracy-forcing effect: Judicial refusal to remake enacted text forces Congress to legislate more responsibly ex 
ante.”). 
57 Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 54, at 658. 
58 Farber & McDonnell, supra note 19, at 622. 
59 The argument in the text has focused on textualism for the sake of brevity, but the same points hold for the other 
methodological exceptions allowed for so-called common-law statutes.  That is, it may be possible for intentionalist 
interpreters, or proponents of strict statutory stare decisis, to explain why Title VII and the Sherman Act should be treated 
differently.  But the convenient “common-law” label masks both the need for such explanations and the thorny problems of 
line-drawing they inevitably would confront. 
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If the “sweeping . . . terms” of common-law statutes do not differentiate them categorically 
from other judicially administered statutes, perhaps their common-law heritage does.  Most of the 
statutes that appear regularly on the “common-law” list codify legal principles that had been 
developed by the courts as common law.60  Arguably, that feature might signal an implicit 
delegation to courts, taking the place of ambiguity as the relevant proxy.61 
The argument that a common-law history serves as a trigger for ongoing judicial lawmaking 
finds oblique support in the literature on why Congress delegates to agencies.  Although that 
literature is agency-focused, even a brief review reveals that delegations to courts are hard to 
explain in the conventional terms.  For example, one of the principal justifications for agency 
delegations, particularly in complex policy areas, is that agencies have expertise that Congress 
lacks.62  Delegations to courts are a mystery on this view, because generalist judges are unlikely to 
possess any special expertise.63  Moreover, Congress has political and procedural tools for 
steering agency policymaking before it becomes final, thereby minimizing the principal-agent 
problem inherent in any delegation of power.64  But Congress lacks equivalent mechanisms for 
influencing judicial decisionmaking. The only way to correct “bad” judicial decisions is via 
override legislation, a significantly less attractive option for legislators.65  
These considerations suggest that Congress may have fewer reasons to delegate to courts than 
to agencies.  Perhaps it follows that treating statutory ambiguity as evidence of a “legislative 
intent to confer discretion”66—as courts do in the administrative context—would overestimate 
Congress’s desire to authorize judicial policymaking.  And, perhaps, a history of common-law 
authority offers a more accurate proxy for an intent to delegate.  Notions of judicial expertise may 
have more traction in areas that have traditionally been the province of the common law, where 
courts have substantial experience.  Similarly, the incrementalism of common-law 
decisionmaking, and the related idea that the common law will “work[] itself pure” over time,67 
                                                   
60 See, e.g., Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1988) (explaining that the Sherman Act 
“invokes the common law itself”); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (explaining that the private right of 
action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 “resembles, but is not identical to, common-law tort 
actions for deceit and misrepresentation”); Balganesh, supra note 7, at 1167-68 (explaining that the fair use doctrine and the 
idea/expression dichotomy in the Copyright Act “merely codify rules developed independently by courts in the past”); 
Menell, supra note 48, at 1292-97 (detailing the common-law background of the Patent Act). 
61 See Leval, supra note 7, at 197 (“Regardless . . . of whether the text is detailed or consists of only a vague generalized 
reference to the body of doctrine, if the intention of the statute was not to make law but to give recognition in statutory form 
to a previously developed body of court-made law, proper interpretation of the statute demands that it be so understood.”); 
Merrill, supra note 14, at 44 (“[A]n inference of delegation arises when . . . Congress adopts a legal standard that is borrowed 
from (or ‘codifies’) the common law.”); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 818 (1983) (“If the legislature enacts into statute law a common law concept, . . . that is a 
clue that the courts are to interpret the statute with the freedom with which they would construe and apply a common law 
principle—in which event the values of the framers may not be controlling after all.”); cf. Farber & McDonnell, supra note 
19, at 658 (“One of the main arguments for the delegation theory is that the Sherman Act uses common law terms, and must 
therefore contemplate a common-law process of law development.”); Menell, supra note 48, at 1311 (arguing that the 
common-law history of the Patent Act demands that courts “perpetuate the common law-type jurisprudential tradition”).  
62 See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers:  A Political 
Science Approach, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 947, 967 (1998). 
63 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“Judges are not experts 
in the field . . . .”). 
64 For a useful overview, see Bressman, supra note 38, at 569-71. 
65 See Lemos, supra note 30, at 420-23. 
66 Scalia, supra note 35, at 516. 
67 Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself 140 (1940) (“The common law works itself pure and adapts itself to the 
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may reduce the risk that judge-made law will veer sharply away from congressional expectations.  
In short, courts may seem like better delegates when the job consists of building on a body of law 
that courts themselves constructed. 
Again, this view may work as a description of many statutes that enjoy the “common-law” 
label.  But it does not work as a means of demarcating a separate category of such statutes.  Many, 
perhaps most, judicially administered statutes build on common-law concepts, yet do not trigger 
the methodological concessions courts have made for the Sherman Act and its peers.68  Here, too, 
any difference between common-law statutes and “normal” statutes is one of degree rather than 
kind. 
Common-law concepts enjoy pride of place in many statutes that no one has ever categorized 
as common-law statutes.69  For example, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA)—a statute the Court has described as “comprehensive and reticulated”70—incorporates 
the general jurisprudence of trusts.71  Title VII and other statutes that forbid discrimination against 
“employees” incorporate the common law of agency in defining that term.72  Federal courts draw 
from common-law principles developed at the state level when interpreting such statutes,73 but 
they do not feel free to elaborate the law in the policy-driven manner associated with antitrust law. 
With respect to statutes that come closer to the “sweeping . . . general[ity]” of the Sherman 
Act, the Court’s approach has been at best inconsistent.74  Consider the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act (FELA), which created a federal tort remedy for railroad workers injured by their 
employers’ negligence.  The statute “does not define negligence, leaving that question to be 
determined . . . ‘by the common law principles as established and applied in the federal courts.’”75  
As Peter Strauss has detailed, early courts “accepted [FELA] as a remedy to ‘be developed and 
enlarged to meet changing conditions and changing concepts of the industry’s duty toward its 
                                                                                                                                                               
needs of a new day.”). 
68 See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 95 n.34 (1981) (“[O]nce 
Congress addresses a subject, even a subject previously governed by federal common law, the justification for lawmaking by 
the federal courts is greatly diminished. . . . [T]he task of the federal courts is to interpret and apply statutory law, not to 
create common law.”). 
69 Although my focus here is on civil statutes, common-law concepts are legion in federal criminal law.  For an 
illuminating discussion of the role federal courts play in elaborating federal criminal law, notwithstanding the rule of lenity 
and the longstanding rule barring federal “common law” crimes, United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 32 
(1812), see Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 5, 6-9 (1997). 
70 Mertens v. Hewett & Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993). 
71 See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1996) (noting that fiduciary duties under ERISA “draw much 
of their content form the common law of trusts”); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989) 
(invoking the Restatement (Second) of Trusts to identify the standards that courts should use in reviewing benefit 
determinations made by ERISA plan administrators). 
72 Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 521-22 (2006) (discussing courts’ treatment 
of Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Title VII). 
73 Id.  
74 Compare Eskridge, supra note 46, at 1485-88 (critiquing cases in which the Court took a static approach to § 1983 
rather than drawing guidance from “[t]he modern common law of tort remedies and immunities” and “the Court’s ongoing 
policy-balancing”), with id. at 1540 & n.247 (citing cases in which the Court “relied mainly on current policy and common 
law doctrine” in interpreting § 1983); compare Menell, supra note 48, at __ (ms. at 11-16) (criticizing Bilski majority for 
focusing on the ordinary meaning of the words in § 101 of the Patent Act rather than their common-law meaning), with 
J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135 (2001) (explaining that § 101 is a “dynamic 
provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions”). 
75 Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949) (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Mo. 1943)). 
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workers.’”76  But the Supreme Court has shifted course in more recent years, grounding its 
interpretations of FELA in the common law as it existed when the statute was enacted in 1908 and 
disclaiming any authority to adjust the statutory remedy in light of modern demands.77  Although 
the Court does not deny that the statute’s meaning may evolve over time as the common law of 
negligence evolves, it sees state—not federal—courts as the appropriate drivers of such change.78  
The Court’s treatment of the Sherman Act provides a sharp contrast.  The Court has rejected a 
static view of the Sherman Act under which the statute’s meaning would be determined by “the 
contours of the common law of 1890.”79  Writing for the Court in Business Electronics Corp. v. 
Sharp Electronics Corp., Justice Scalia explained that the Sherman Act “adopted the term 
‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential.  It invokes the common law itself, and not 
merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”80  Yet the Court 
has not linked its decisions to contemporary common law either.  Instead it has treated the 
Sherman Act as “an exercise in applied economics,” pursuing the statute’s presumed goal of 
preserving competition “without regard to the strictures of the common law.”81  
This contrast undermines any claim that the freewheeling policymaking associated with 
common-law statutes (or at least some of them, some of the time) can be explained and justified 
by a tradition of common-lawmaking.  Something is amiss here.  If a common-law tradition is 
persuasive evidence of a congressional intent to delegate broad authority to the judiciary, courts 
are ignoring many delegations by focusing on the short list of common-law statutes.  If, on the 
other hand, a common-law tradition signals at most that courts may continue to rely on common-
law developments in interpreting the statute over time, then the Court has overstepped its bounds 
in the Sherman Act and perhaps elsewhere.82  I suspect the answer lies somewhere in the middle, 
and that the appropriate approach to common-law concepts turns on contextual factors including 
the purpose of the statute, the importance of stability and predictability in the relevant area, 
courts’ relative institutional competence to craft policy on the subject, and other evidence of a 
congressional desire to leave the resolution of the issue to the judiciary.  But rather than engaging 
with those or other explanatory factors, the Court proceeds as if certain methodological 
consequences follow inevitably from Congress’s incorporation of common-law concepts—
ignoring the fact that in one case the common law is constraining and, in another, liberating. 
V.  DELEGATIONS TO COURTS TODAY 
In sum, the label of “common-law statute” obscures more than in illuminates.  It is difficult, if 
not impossible, to define a category of common-law statutes in a way that differentiates statutes 
                                                   
76 Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 429, 431 (quoting 
Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958)). 
77 Id. at 421-34 (discussing Gottshall v. Conrail, 512 U.S. 532 (1994)); cf. Monessen Southwestern R. Co. v. Morgan, 
486 U.S. 330 (1998) (holding that FELA does not permit the recovery of prejudgment interest, in part because such interest 
was generally barred in common law actions in 1908). 
78 Strauss, supra note 76, at 436 (“It is as if Congress’s delegation to the federal courts to develop common law remedies 
for railroad worker injuries conveyed or recognized far less judicial authority than a state common law court would have—an 
authority necessarily dependent on what state courts were doing.”). 
79 Farber & McDonnell, supra note 19, at 636 (outlining the “substantial argument” for such a static view). 
80 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988).  
81 Farber & McDonnell, supra note 19, at 639. 
82 See id. at 659 (“When Congress contemplates common-law decisions by the courts, there is no reason to suppose that 
it had this kind of blatantly result-oriented decisionmaking in mind.  There is particularly little reason to ascribe this view to 
Congresses that acted in the era of Swift v. Tyson, when it was thought that judges ‘found’ rather than ‘made’ common law.”). 
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like the Sherman Act from the many other statutes that judges must interpret and implement.  If 
there are salient differences between the Sherman Act and Title VII, for example, they are 
differences in emphasis.  The difficult questions are when, whether, and why those more subtle 
differences justify a shift in methodology—i.e., why textualism, intentionalism, and super-strong 
statutory stare decisis are appropriate for some statutes but not others.  The fiction that there is a 
naturally occurring category of common-law statutes deflects much-needed attention from those 
questions.  
But the problem with the “common-law” label goes beyond the interpretive questions on 
which I have focused so far.  The label also serves to mask an important set of institutional 
questions about when, whether, and why delegations to courts make sense today.  By tethering 
such delegations to venerated tradition of the common law, the label makes judicial policymaking 
seem familiar, uncontroversial, inevitable.  In so doing, it assumes away the many differences 
between common-lawmaking of yesteryear and common-lawmaking today.   
Consider, first, the divergence between how courts make law today and how they made law 
when many of the so-called common-law statutes were enacted.  For example, the traditional 
conception of common-lawmaking was passive, “a corollary of the [courts’] obligation to decide . 
. . any matters that parties put before them.”83  That ceased to be true, at least for the Supreme 
Court, with the advent of discretionary jurisdiction.  The modern Court’s certiorari power enables 
the Justices to pick and choose opportunities for lawmaking, “encourages them to speak more 
broadly than the particular facts before them require,” and “permits them to defend themselves 
against the inconvenience of facts that might appear to compel movement opposite to the direction 
they prefer.”84  Moreover, given the Court’s shrinking docket, a great deal of time may elapse 
before the Court considers an issue, allowing a consensus to develop in the lower courts.  
Historically, “[t]hat trend would itself operate as a signal to a common law court—a reason if not 
precedent for reaching a similar conclusion.”85  But the Court seems to grant little deference to the 
legal conclusions of the lower courts.86  As a result, its interventions into statutory law may be far 
more disruptive than the common-law tradition would suggest.  The ever-growing ratio of cases to 
courts places additional strain on the analogy to traditional common-law practices, and on the 
notion that a common-law background can function as a substitute for specialized expertise.  
Courts cannot develop familiarity with statutes when they confront them so rarely.  Although the 
problem is most stark at the Supreme Court level, it extends all the way down the federal judicial 
hierarchy.87   
A backward-looking conception of common-law statutes ignores these and other changes in 
the procedures for judicial lawmaking.  Perhaps more importantly, a focus on common-law 
history conceals how much the relevant subject areas have changed since the statutes were 
enacted.  The Patent Act illustrates the problem.  The first Patent Act was enacted in 1790.88  At 
that time, technology was mostly uniform: “if you put technology in a bag and shook it, it would 
                                                   
83 Peter L. Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 891, 895 (2001). 
84 Id. 
85 Strauss, supra note 49, at 246. 
86 See Lemos, supra note 30, at 429 (discussing the relationship between Supreme Court and lower court 
decisionmaking in the context of Title VII). 
87 For example, the average district judge sees only a few patent cases a year and handles a patent trial once every seven 
years.  See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 Yale L.J. 2, 16 (2010). 
88 Act of April 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109. 
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make some noise.”89  Patent law was understood as a subset of property law, and analogies to land 
were common.90  Moreover, the administrative state was still in the gestational stage.  The 
institutional choice for Congress at the time was between legislating with specificity or leaving 
matters largely to the courts; the option of delegating lawmaking authority to a regulatory agency 
had yet to become conventional.91 
Fast-forward to today.  Innovation is becoming increasingly technologically and economically 
diverse.  Patent scholars now recognize that harnessing the innovation-promoting potential of 
patent requires distinguishing among industries and inventions—a task that demands a 
sophisticated understanding of both technology and economics.92  Meanwhile, there is good 
reason to believe that clarity and predictability are particularly valuable in the patent field, since 
“setting ex ante expectations is critical to well performing property systems.”93  Yet courts’ lack 
of expertise, and the sporadic nature of their encounters with patent law, limit their ability to craft 
bright-line rules that serve those goals without sacrificing accuracy in individual cases.94  
Commentators have urged courts to focus instead on elaborating the law case by case in the 
incremental common-law fashion.95  The advantage of the common-law method, at least in theory, 
is that it enables judges to apply the law with sensitivity to the circumstances of each case.  But to 
translate that advantage from theory to practice, judges must be able to understand the 
circumstances of each case.  That may not be true in most patent cases.96 
All of this has prompted claims that the “patent system is in crisis.”97  Nevertheless, most 
scholars have focused their attention on tweaking the current system of judicial administration, 
without seriously considering whether that system is up to the modern task.98  Only a few have 
suggested moving primary authority for law-elaboration from the federal courts to an expert 
agency.99 
Similar problems are evident in the antitrust field.100  Antitrust law today implicates 
                                                   
89 Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and 
Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577, 585 (1999). 
90 See Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1747, 1764-66 (2011) (describing early 
understandings and applications of patent law). 
91 See Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 275, 303. 
92 See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009). 
93 Burstein, supra note 90, at 36. 
94 See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 
Colum. L. Rev. 1035 (2003). 
95 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 609, 614 
(2009) (arguing that standards for patentable subject matter perform better than rules in the long run); Rai, supra note 94, at 
1101-02 (advocating standard- rather than rule-driven patent doctrine that is sensitive to facts and policy). 
96 Not only is the law of patent “rather arcane,” Lee, supra note 87, at 12, but applying the law to the facts of each case 
requires a great deal of technological sophistication.  See Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on 
Fact, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 877, 878 (2002) (“[D]ifficult questions of scientific fact are likely to arise more routinely in 
patent law than in virtually any other field of law.”). 
97 Merges, supra note 89, at 591; see also BURK & LEMLEY.  
98 See generally, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1444 (2010) (arguing that venue rules 
should be adjusted so as to concentrate patent cases by industry in select district courts); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, 
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1619 (2007) (arguing that, in addition to the Federal 
Circuit, at least one generalist circuit court should be authorized to hear patent appeals); Rai, supra note 96 (urging the 
creation of specialized trial courts). 
99 See generally Burstein, supra note 90, Masur, supra note 91.   
100 See generally Daniel Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 49 (2007). 
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complicated and contested questions of economic theory.  As such, it poses serious challenges for 
generalist judges and juries.  If anything, those challenges have intensified in recent years, as the 
Court has moved away from per se rules and toward more flexible standards that allow judges to 
consider the challenged conduct in context to determine whether it appears to be an unreasonable 
restraint of trade.  But the more nuanced and complex antitrust law becomes, the farther it drifts 
from the ken of the average federal judge.   As in patent, while flexible standards hold the promise 
of improving the fit between the law and the facts of each case, courts’ limited expertise sharply 
reduces the accuracy of case-by-case adjudication.  
Considerations of institutional competence therefore call into question whether a robust 
judicial role in policymaking is in fact a good idea within the supposed category of common-law 
statutes.  The point is not that courts should revert to a more formalist methodology in interpreting 
the Patent or Sherman Acts.  Unless and until Congress adjusts the prevailing institutional 
arrangements, courts have little choice but to continue to muddle along; pretending that the 
statutes answer questions they clearly do not answer is not an attractive alternative.  But neither 
does it make sense to pretend that the delegation can be justified by the common-law tradition that 
existed when the statutes were enacted.  
The argument here works both ways.  If, as I have suggested, the “common-law” label is 
unhelpful insofar as it connects modern delegations to historical common-lawmaking, the problem 
is one of exclusion as well as inclusion.  That is, reliance on the label may suggest—perhaps 
improperly—that statutes outside the special category do not confer discretion on the courts.  Yet 
courts may be much better suited to develop the law of employment discrimination, for example, 
than the law of antitrust.  Not only do courts have experience enforcing the antidiscrimination 
provisions of the Constitution, but their remove from majoritarian politics makes them 
particularly valuable delegates on the statutory side of antidiscrimination law.101  And, with no 
agency presently empowered to play a strong role in interpretation and implementation of Title 
VII, the practical need for judicial policymaking is at least as strong as in the fields of patent and 
antitrust.   
This Chapter is not the place to make a comprehensive case for beefing up the judicial role in 
elaborating antidiscrimination law, or rolling back judicial involvement in patent and antitrust.  
My goal is more modest.  I have sought to show that our existing practice with respect to 
delegations to courts is, at best, half correct.  On the one hand, courts’ treatment of the so-called 
common-law statutes reflects a healthy recognition that delegations matter, and that the 
appropriate approach to statutory interpretation depends on the role courts must play in 
developing the law.  On the other hand, neither courts nor commentators have devoted much 
effort to identifying court-liberating statutes or assessing when and why such liberation is 
normatively attractive.  The prevailing rhetoric on delegations obscures those important issues by 
perpetuating the fiction that delegations to courts occupy an easily identifiable, self-enclosed 
category of common-law statutes.  The fiction is counterproductive, and we should abandon it. 
                                                   
101 See Lemos, supra note 12, at 470. 
